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Returns to buying upward revision and selling downward revision: Some 
preliminary evidence from Canada 
Abstract 
 
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the role of earnings forecast revisions 
by equity analysts in predicting Canadian stock returns.  
Design/methodology/approach - the sample covers 420 Canadian firms over the period 
1998-2009. It analyses investors’ reactions to 27,271 upward revisions and 32,005 
downward revisions of analysts’ forecast for Canadian quoted companies. To test whether 
analysts’ earnings forecast revisions have impacts on stock return continuation, forecast 
revision portfolios similar to Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) are constructed. The paper 
analyses the returns gained from a trading strategy based on buying the strong upward 
revisions portfolio and short selling the strong downward revisions portfolio. It also 
separates the sample into upward and downward revisions 
Findings –  
a) new information in the form of analyst forecast revisions is not impounded efficiently 
into stock prices. Significant returns persist for a trading strategy that buys stocks with 
recent upward revisions and short sells stocks with recent downward revisions. 
b) good news is impounded into stock prices more slowly than bad news  
c) post-earnings forecast revisions drift is negatively related to analyst coverage. The effect 
is particularly strong for stocks with greatest number of upward revisions  
d) the introduction of the better disclosure standards has made the Canadian stock market 
more efficient.  
Originality/value – This paper adds to the limited evidence on the effect of analyst forecast 
revisions on the returns of Canadian stocks. It sheds light on the importance of analysts’ 
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earnings forecast information and offers support for the investor conservatism and 
information diffusion hypotheses. It also shows how policy can improve market efficiency.  





The efficient market model assumes that new information is immediately impounded into 
a stock’s price. One source of new information is analysts forecast revisions. It is assumed 
that analysts have an information advantage about firms’ future earnings prospects 
compared with individual investors and therefore analysts’ earnings forecast revisions act 
as an information intermediary between firms and investors. It is believed that analysts 
have better knowledge of a firm’s fundamental information and that this knowledge 
therefore reduces the information asymmetry between firms and investors. Studies have 
pointed out that analysts’ earnings forecasts provide investors with valuable information, 
for example, Asquith et al. (2005) found that analysts’ reports provide new information 
and that the market reacts to earnings forecast revisions, recommendation revisions, and 
price target revisions. Franket et al. (2006) also find bad news forecast revisions have a 
greater impact on price than positive forecast revisions. 
A number of behavioural theories have been proposed that explain the existence of 
these continuing abnormal returns in terms of biases in the way investors interpret new 
information. This paper evaluates two of them: first, based on Barberis et al. (1998), the 
investor conservatism theory proposes that investors are slow to change their views in the 
light of new information; and second, Hong et al. (2000) who argue that the speed of 
information diffusion explains continuing abnormal returns. 
Barberis et al (1998) develop a model based on Griffin and Tversky (1992) which has 
two main elements – the strength and weight of information. When faced with forecast 
revisions, investors place too much emphasis on the strength of the revisions and too little 
to their weight. Barberis et al. (1998) refer to this as investor conservatism, something that 
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will lead to an under-reaction to new information. Thus, new information such as analyst 
forecast revisions are slowly incorporated into stock prices because investors do not react 
appropriately to the new information. Daniel et al. (1998 and 2001) propose that this may 
be due to investors being overconfident in their own private information, something which 
leads them to play down the importance of the forecast revisions. Therefore new 
information will only be partially incorporated into stock prices. For example analysts’ 
forecast revisions are not fully impounded into the stock price and so abnormal returns can 
be earned in the future. Barberis et al. (1998) therefore argue that this conservatism is due 
to an investor’s failure to adequately update their beliefs. 
A number of studies have investigated the extent to which information in analysts' 
forecast revisions are efficiently impounded into US stock prices. Givoly and Lakonishok 
(1980) find analysts' earnings forecast revisions provide valuable information to investors 
and report the existence of a post-forecast revision drift. Stickel (1991) and Chan et al. 
(1996) find that returns persist for firms whose consensus forecasts have been recently 
revised upward. Barberis et al. (1998) find that investors do not always react in proper 
proportion to new information and that this conservatism bias leads to individuals playing 
down the importance of new information when updating expectations. Elgers et al. (2001) 
offer support for the argument that the market’s earnings expectations may fail to 
incorporate some portion of the value-relevant information in analysts’ earnings forecasts. 
Gleason and Lee (2003) also find abnormal returns present after analysts forecast revisions. 
Zhang (2006) reports that investors underreact to new information and that good news will 
be associated with higher future returns. Frankel et al. (2006) report that bad news forecast 
revisions have a greater effect on stock prices than good news forecast revisions. Peng and 
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Xiong (2006) found that investors pay more attention to market- and sector-wide 
information rather than firm-specific factors. Dellavigna and Pollet (2009) reported that the 
post-earnings announcement drift is caused by an under-reaction to information. 
Hirshleifer et al. (2011) also find that investors neglect information about a firm’s future 
earnings which further leads to stock price under-reactions to earnings surprises 
announcements. Hui and Yeung (2013) report that investors under-react to analysts forecast 
revisions that contain industry-wide news. 
Other studies have analysed the efficiency with which non-US stock markets reacted 
to new information relating to analyst forecast revisions. Dische (2002) shows that stock 
prices on the German stock market under-react to analysts’ forecast revisions. Liu et al 
(2003) find that the UK stock market is inefficient when reacting to analyst forecast 
revisions. Doukas and McKnight (2005) and McKnight and Todd (2006) find that 
European stocks under-reaction to forecast revisions.  
We therefore propose 
Hypothesis 1: consistent with the investor conservatism theory, we expect new 
information not to be fully incorporated into stock prices in the short run  
Hong et al. (2000) propose that the speed of information diffusion can be proxied by 
the extent of analyst cover. The greater the number of analysts covering a firm, the faster 
will be the information diffusion. Similarly, the fewer the analysts covering a firm, the 
slower will be the information diffusion. Forecast revisions will therefore have less of an 
effect for low analyst covered firms because investors will be less aware of the new 
forecasts. Analyst coverage can therefore reduce information asymmetry among investors 
(Bowen et al., 2008) and lead to an increase in stock price informativeness. Thus, more 
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informative prices, with respect to future earnings, lead to a faster incorporation of common 
information into prices (Brennan et al., 1993; Ayers and Freeman, 2003). Consistent with 
this, Hong et al. (2000) find that information is incorporated into stock prices more slowly 
in low analyst coverage stocks. Doukas and McKnight (2005) find a significant return 
continuation effect in low analyst coverage stocks, a finding that supports the information 
diffusion hypothesis. In contrast, McKnight and Todd and Hou et al. (2012) find no 
evidence of slow information diffusion for European and Pacific Region countries 
respectively. In addition, Dou et al. (2015) find no evidence that analyst cover affects post 
earnings announcement drift.    
Although the evidence is mixed, we hypothesise: 
Hypothesis 2: analyst cover will affect the speed with which new information is 
incorporated into stock prices.   
In addition, prior research has also shown the importance of firm characteristics such 
as size, book-to-market ratio, and analyst coverage as determinants of stock abnormal 
returns. Investors have easier access to firm-specific information for large firms, value 
stocks, and stocks covered by large numbers of analysts. The importance of the size 
anomaly is reported by Jegadeesh and Titman (2001), Hong et al. (2000), and Hameed and 
Kusnadi (2002) who find that the stock return continuation effect is stronger in small firms 
and tends to decrease as firm size increases. Fama and French (1998) find evidence of a 
value premium for high book-to-market stocks.  
Given the dearth of research with regard to the impact new information has on 
Canadian stock prices, this study investigates investors’ reactions to analysts’ earnings 
forecast revisions in a Canadian setting. It therefore provides an out of sample test of the 
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Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) portfolio revisions approach. Canada’s stock market is 
enormously important to world investors. To make it a preferred investment setting, the 
Canadian stock market has undergone more change in the past decade than in the previous 
century. Through a combination of regulatory change and the opening of the industry to 
competition where multiple markets are all competing to trade the same stocks (especially, 
the emergence of electronic trading), Canada’s stock market is somewhat complex.  
Like other developed markets, Canada has been challenging traditional participants 
such as traders and investors with regard to public policy issues in an effort to reduce its 
complexity. Although the stock market is fragmented, it is less complicated than the United 
States. For example, where Canada does have high-frequency trading it is not as 
problematic as it is in the United States. This is because of the way Canada addresses public 
policy issues. Canada’s regulators have set internationally recognized standards to facilitate 
the enforcement of their policies.  
Similar to the U.S implemented Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) to eliminate selective 
disclosure to a few privileged interested parties since October 23, 2000, the Canadian 
Securities Administrators (CSA) also adopted a new disclosure policy (National Policy 51-
201) on July 12, 2002. It sets out timely disclosure obligations and disclosure practices for 
reporting companies and best disclosure practices that are adopted by companies to help 
manage their disclosure obligations. Puri (2012) asserted that Canadian capital markets are 
closely integrated with the United States and have generally followed its lead on major 
legislative reforms. Investor perceptions about the disclosure practices and enforcement 
effectiveness in Canada should, therefore, be similar to those found in the United States.  
Nevertheless, with the landscape ever changing and the enforcement of rules 
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becoming even more critical, Canada has shown a strong commitment to having a sound 
reputation for a visible stock market and it is doing its best to regulate where necessary to 
ensure price transparency. The likeness of disclosure practices between countries offer 
Canada as a preferred investment setting for both retail and institutional investors. As a 
result of the above arguments, it is believed that this study can increase our understanding 
of the Canadian capital market and provide a better understanding of how individual 
investors adjust their beliefs given a change in analysts’ earnings forecasts information. 
Our contributions to the literature are as follows. First, we study the relationship 
between analyst forecast revisions and post-forecast price drift by forming a trading 
strategy that buys stocks with the upward revisions and short sells stocks with the 
downward revisions. There is limited evidence of the factors influencing the impact on new 
information on the efficiency of the Canadian stock market. One study, Chudek et al. 
(2011), found evidence that Canadian stock prices tend to drift in the direction of an 
earnings surprise, defined as new information relative to the consensus analyst forecast. 
However, they did not look at the effect of analyst forecast revisions, something which this 
paper does. Second, we test two theories, Barberis et al’s (1998) investor conservatism 
model and Hong et al.’s (2000) speed of information diffusion in relation to Canada. Third, 
we incorporate the 2008 recession into the analysis to study its potential impact on the post-
forecast revision price drift. Fourth, we assess the impact of the introduction of a policy 
that was designed to improve disclosure on price drift. 
Our results show that new information is not impounded efficiently into stock prices 
on the Canadian Stock market. Overall, we find support for the findings of Barberis et al. 
(1998) Bloomfield et al. (2000) and Zhang (2006), who argue that investors do not always 
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react in proper proportion to new information. We find that investors tend to underreact to 
forecast revisions news which leads to returns continuing over a one month holding period. 
However, this result holds only for good news. In contrast, there is evidence that bad news 
is efficiently incorporated into stock prices We also find that low analyst coverage 
increases abnormal returns for both negative and positive revision counts portfolios, thus 
supporting the information diffusion hypothesis of Hong et al. (2000). This study therefore 
finds that positive information contained in analysts’ earnings forecast revisions has a 
short-term investment value.  
Moreover, we find that firm characteristics are important determinants of the post-
forecast revision price drift. The results also indicate that post-earnings forecast revisions 
drift is positively related to book-to-market which suggests that investors tend to underreact 
to value stocks compared to their reaction to revisions for growth stocks. We also find 
reduced abnormal stock returns after the new disclosure standards were put in place 
suggesting that the policy has been effective in increasing the market’s efficiency. Finally, 
we report that the financial crisis reduced stock returns, particularly in relation to positive 
revisions, further showing how the market seems to be less willing to accept positive news.  
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and 
sample. Section 3 describes the portfolio strategy. Section 4 reports the results of the 
regression analysis and Conclusions are presented in Section 5. 
2. DATA AND SAMPLE  
 
The data for the Canadian firms were collected from two sources. The primary data 
were collected from the Institutional Brokerage Estimate System (I/B/E/S) International 
Summary database. The sample consists of monthly stock returns, the number of shares 
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outstanding, the number of analysts covering a firm and the number of upward and 
downward revisions. Book to market equity value and other financial data are from 
DataStream. The sample period runs from July 1998 to June 2009. We include all firms 
from the dataset in our analyses to minimize survivorship bias. However, each stock must 
have available data on market capitalization at the beginning of each month with a 
minimum 12 months returns history. Our net sample is 420 Canadian firms for the testing 
period. 
Table 1 reports the year-by-year descriptive statistics for the whole testing period. The 
number of covered firms steadily increased from 134 in 1998 to 363 in 2008, but fell to 
340 in 2009. The total number of firms covered is 420 over the testing period for this study. 
The average number of analysts covering each firm is 6.2. We also observe that the average 
number of analysts peaks in 2001 at 7.54 and falls to a low of 5 in 2008. 
Table 1 also shows analysts issued more downward earnings forecasts than upward 
earnings forecasts over the period. This implies that analysts are more pessimistic about 
firms’ future earnings during the period under analysis. When the data are examined by 
year we find analysts are more optimistic in the first three years but more pessimistic in 
each of the following nine years. The increased pessimism since 2001 may initially be 
explained by the financial markets fall after the 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States. 
The year which experienced that largest difference between upwards and downwards was 
2008, the year of the financial crisis following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in mid-
September 2008.  
Table 1 also reports mean and median size and book-to-market ratios for our sample 
firms. The average firm size is 3.2 billion Canadian dollars and book-to-market ratio is 
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0.76. We also find that the median firm size continuously increased until 2002 and then 
starts to decline, and the median firm size reaches the lower point in 2009; in contrast, their 
book-to-market ratio peaks in 2009. 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
3. PORTFOLIO STRATEGIES 
 
To test whether analysts’ earnings forecast revisions affect stock return continuation, 
we construct forecast revision portfolios similar to Jegadeesh and Titman (2001). As 
McKnight and Todd (2006) and Zhang (2006) we use a revision count variable to show the 
extent to which analysts forecast revisions move in the same direction, or the extent to 
which they differ in terms of the direction of the forecast. It therefore identifies the degree 
of optimism or pessimism associated with the revisions. It is proposed that the measure 
reflects the greater emphasis that investors place on the volume of revisions rather than on 
the size of the revisions. The revision count approach also allows us to analyse the extent 
to which there are any differences in the reaction to upward revisions (good news) and 
downward revisions (bad news).    
We construct a revision count variable, REVt, at month t defined as the difference 
between the number of upward (UPt,t-1) and downward (DOWNt,,t-1) revisions made by 
analysts in the last monthly report. It is therefore defined as: 
REVt = UPt,.t-1 – DOWNt,,t-1 
 
If 
(i) REVt >0, the forecast revision count is positive and indicates that analysts are 
optimistic about a firm’s futures earnings  
(ii) REVt <0, the forecast revision count is negative and indicates that analysts are 
pessimistic about a firm’s futures earnings  
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(iii) REVt = 0, analysts have not changed their expectations about a firm’s future 
earnings 
At beginning of each month, we sort all the stocks from the sample into three 
portfolios based on the previous month’s revisions count values. Portfolio P3 (P1) is a 
strong upward (downward) portfolio which contains those stocks with the highest (lowest) 
forecast revision values. Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the whole sample sort by 
three revisions count values. It shows that the strong upward revision count portfolio (P3) 
has more upward revisions (20,949) than downward revisions (3,708), and the downward 
revision count portfolio (P1) has more downward (25,352) than upward revisions (3,827). 
The average size for the upward revision count portfolio (P3) is 4,940.86 million and 
3,921.l5 million for the downward revision count portfolio (P1). It also shows more growth 
stocks in the upward revision count portfolio and both the upward (P3) and downward 
revision count portfolios (P1) attract more analyst interesting than P2 portfolio.  
[Table 2 about here] 
These portfolios are equally weighted at the end of the formation period and held for 
the following 1, 3, 6, 9, 12 months. We also skip one-month between formation and holding 
period to mitigate the effect of information announcements on market microstructure. The 
trading strategy P3 – P1 consists of buying the strong upward portfolio (P3) and short 
selling the strong downward portfolio (P1).  
We do not scale the REV by the total number of analysts covering a specific stock 
because we believe that investors will be more aware of the absolute volume of revisions 
rather than the relative volume of revisions. Moreover, our forecast revisions measure 
captures the degree of herding among equity analysts (Welch, 2000).  
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Table 3 reports the characteristic based benchmark portfolio method to calculate the 
abnormal return, with the characteristics based on size and book-to-market ratios and 
rebalanced every month. It also shows the returns gained from a trading strategy based on 
buying the strong upward portfolio and short selling the strong downward portfolio, that is, 
P3 – P1. For the one-month holding period, the trading strategy generates statistically 
significant one month average returns of 1.76%  The table also shows that the trading 
strategy P3 – P1, yields decreasing monthly average returns as the holding period is 
extended. For example, the returns fall to 0.69% after six months and 0.65% after 12 
months. Having established that the post-forecast revisions drift seems stronger in the most 
recent period, the following regression analysis concentrates on one-month holding period 
trading strategy. 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Table 4 reports the characteristic based benchmark-adjusted monthly portfolio returns 
for the sub-period analysis for all stocks in Canada. The policy is National Policy 51-201 
which the Canadian Securities Administrators have adopted on 2002 to address concerns 
about the practice of selective disclosure. Column 1 reports one-month holding period 
returns before the policy and Column 2 reports return for after the policy for three revision 
count portfolios. As predicted, returns post the introduction of the policy are less than those 
before policy. Column 4 reports the return difference between the Column (2) and (1). The 
return difference in the strong upward count revision portfolio (P3) is -1.09% and is 
statistically significant. The downward revision count portfolio (P1) is -0.92% and is also 
significant. Column 3 reports returns for the period during the financial crisis of 2008. The 
downward revision count portfolio is significantly negative and lower than upward revision 
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count portfolio. The last Column reports the difference between crisis period (2008-2009) 
and the after policy (2002-2007) time period. It shows significantly lower returns during 
the crisis period, some -2.67% for downward revision count portfolio and -2.08% for 
upward revision count portfolio. 
 [Table 4 about here] 
 
4. REGRESSIONS ANALYSIS 
  
We continue our analysis by performing a Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross sectional 
regression of Canadian stock returns. Post-announcement monthly abnormal returns at time 
t+1 are regressed on a set of explanatory variables. This provides information about 
determinants of post-announcement monthly abnormal returns for Canadian stocks. The 
regression specification for the pooled sample is as follow: 
, 1 0 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 ,
7 8 , 9 10 , ,
i t i t i t i t i t i t i t
t i t t t i t t i t
Ret REV MEi BM RAC DISP MOMENTUM
Policy REV Policy CRISIS REV CRSIS
      
    
        
     
(1) 
Where Reti,t+1 is market adjusted returns for stock i at time t+1. The forecast revision 
(REV) is the difference between the number of upward revisions and the number of 
downward revisions by analysts since last monthly report at time t. Firm size, (ME), is the 
natural logarithm of the market value of the equity in Canadian dollars at time t. BM is the 
book-to-market value of equity at time t. RAC is residual analyst cover measured by the 
residual from the regression of log (1+number of analysts) on log (firm size) at time t. It 
controls for the influence of firm size on analyst coverage, Hong et al. (2000). Following 
Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002), dispersion (DISP) is the standard deviation of 
analysts' current-fiscal-year annual earnings per share forecasts scaled by the absolute 
value of the mean earnings forecast at time t. MOMENTUM is measured as the difference 
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between the equally-weighted average return of firms with the higher 30 percent of 11-
month returns lagged by 1 month and the average return of firms with the lower 30 
percentage. CRISIS is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 during the sub-prime crisis 
period (year 2008), and 0 otherwise. POLICY is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the analyst 
forecast revision is made after 2002 when National Policy 51-201 became effective and 
equal to 0 if made before 2002. REV×POLICY is the interaction term of REV and Policy. 
REV × CRISIS is the interaction term of REV and CRISIS. A negative value for 
REVxPOLICY would imply that the more upward forecast revisions, the greater the effect 
of the new disclosure policy on stock returns. A positive value for REV×CRISIS suggests 
that the financial crisis would have a larger effect on the abnormal returns of stocks that 
had more upward forecast revisions.  
Table 5 reports results from Fama and MacBeth cross-sectional regressions of 
monthly stock returns on consensus recommendation revisions (Column 1), and interacted 
with the National Policy 51-201 (Column 2) and interacted with the 2008 financial crisis 
(Column 3). 
As hypothesized, column 1 shows a positive, significant relationship between forecast 
revisions count (REV) and post-announcement stock returns. This suggests that upward 
earnings forecast revisions lead to strong post-forecast revisions drifts. Therefore, analyst 
forecasts of earnings are not fully incorporated into the stock price which suggests that 
investors do not fully adjust their expectations to the newly arriving earnings news 
(Hirshleifer et al., 2001). In terms of magnitude, a two standard deviations increase in REV 
increases abnormal returns by 0.015%. Given that the mean abnormal returns is 0.0038, 




However, we find no evidence to support the speed of diffusion hypothesis given that 
RAC is insignificant. It also found that future stock returns are statistically significant and 
positively related to BM. The results therefore support the value premium argument 
proposed by Fama and French (1998). We also find some evidence that return momentum 
is statistically significant in explaining the cross-sectional differences in expected returns. 
This is consistent with Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) who found that momentum profits are 
driven by cross-sectional differences in expected stock returns.  
Column 2 shows during the post-Policy period, the coefficient on POLICY is 
significant and negative. This suggests that the policy of “best disclosure” practices has 
reduced abnormal stock returns since it was introduced and that it helped make the market 
more efficient. The coefficient on CRISIS is significant and negative and suggesting that 
the US subprime crisis had a significant negative impact on the Canadian equity market to 
the extent that the crisis reduced stock returns by 2.67% per month. Moreover, the 
coefficient on REV×CRISIS is positive and significant supporting the view that 2008 
financial crisis has a greater impact on stock returns for stocks with more upward forecast 
revisions. The result is consistent with Table 4, and indicates that investors tend to 
underreact to upward forecast revisions news, in particular during a period of financial 
difficulties.  
[Table 5 about here] 
 
Table 6 reports the results of estimation based on the extended model (1) for positive 
and negative revisions and investigates the differential impact of good and bad news. The 
results reported in Columns 1-3 refer to bad news, the negative revision count, and 
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Columns 4-6 to good news, the positive revision count. The results show that the positive 
revisions count subsample produces a different outcome to that of the negative revisions 
count group.  
We find an insignificant and negative relationship between forecast revisions and 
stock returns for the negative revision count group. This suggests that bad news, indicated 
by negative revisions, is incorporated quickly into prices.  In contrast, we find a positive 
and significant relationship between forecast revisions and stock returns for the positive 
forecast revision group. This supports the hypothesis that good news is incorporated slowly 
into prices. Therefore, overall, positive forecast revisions lead to stronger post-forecast 
revisions drift than negative forecast revisions. This may reflect the view that investors are 
sceptical of good news revisions because they believe analysts to have incentives to be 
optimistic, McKnight and Todd (2006). The result is consistent with the investor 
conservatism hypothesis, Barberis et al. (1998).  
We also find that stock returns are negatively related to residual analyst coverage 
(RAC), for both positive and negative analyst revisions. This is consistent with the speed 
of information diffusion hypothesis of Hong et al. (2000) which posits that return 
persistence is stronger in lower analyst coverage stocks. Our results show that information 
diffusion is slow irrespective of the type of revision made by analysts. We find that the 
results are statistically stronger for positive revision count group than for the negative 
revision count group.  
We also report that BM is positive and significant for both positive and negative 
revision count groups. This suggests that value premium existence in the Canadian capital 
market (Athanassakos, 2009). A possible explanation for this phenomenon is that value 
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stocks are neglected stocks, and investors tend to underreact to value stocks compared to 
their reaction to revisions for growth stocks. 
We report a positive and significant relationship between MOMENTUM and stock 
returns for positive revision count group, but not for negative revision count group. It 
indicates the underreaction of stocks with good news is partly attributable to the stock 
momentum effect Moreover, the negative association between analyst divergence of 
opinion, DISP, and stock returns for the negative revision count groups indicates that the 
dispersion effect only exists in firms with bad news The results consistent with Diether et 
al (2002) and support the argument that the larger the disagreements about a stock’s value, 
the higher the market price relative to the true value of the stock, and the lower its future 
returns.  
Finally, as shown in the positive revision count group, we find that the coefficient on 
POLICY is negative and significant, suggesting that the introduction of improved 
disclosure has reduced abnormal returns and probably made the market more efficient for 
positive revisions. Furthermore, the 2008 subprime crisis had a negative and significant 
impact on the post-forecast revision drift for the positive revision count group. The result 
confirms previous findings in Table 5 that analysts’ upward forecast revisions was slowly 
incorporated into stock prices during a period of significant financial uncertainty.  





This paper investigates the role of earnings forecast revisions of equity analysts in 
predicting Canadian stock returns. It finds significant returns continuation for a trading 
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strategy that buys stocks with recent upward revisions when netted against stocks with the 
most downward revisions. Specifically, with a one-month holding period, the trading 
strategy generates 1.76% monthly average return however, the returns decrease as the 
holding period increases. In addition, it was found that the drift is gradually reduced in the 
following months as more investors respond to the earnings revision news. We also find 
that new information is not impounded symmetrically and that bad news is incorporated 
more quickly than good. This suggests that investors are less inclined to act on positive 
news but take more account of negative revisions. This is consistent with the investor 
conservatism model. We also find, consistent with the information diffusion hypothesis, 
that earnings drift is higher for firms followed by fewer analysts. We also find evidence 
that the policy designed to improve disclosure improved market efficiency. Finally, we 
report that the financial crisis reduced stock returns, particularly in relation to positive 
revisions, further showing how the market seems to be less willing to accept positive news.  
The results also indicate that post-earnings forecast revisions drift is positively related 
to book-to-market which suggests that investors tend to underreact to value stocks 
compared to their reaction to revisions for growth stocks. 
The findings therefore show that equity analysts do provide useful earnings forecasts 
information to market participants. However, some investors pay limited attention to the 
news of forecast revisions and only gradually learn from the event. Thus, the delayed 
response by investors appears to lead to the short-term stock return continuation.  
The results suggest a number of areas for further research. First, it may be useful to 
know more about the characteristics of the analysts that produce the largest number of 
upgrades and the largest number of downgrades. How far do these characteristics differ? 
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Second, the impact of transaction costs and alternative methods of return measurement 
should be investigated. Finally, further research is needed to explore the institutional and 
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Size (C$mils) Book-to-market 
Mean Median Mean Median 
All 420 6.19 27271 32005 3274.14 462.60 0.76 0.55 
1998 134 7.42 1498 1290 2287.03 451.49 0.66 0.51 
1999 144 7.27 1715 1519 2575.88 501.85 0.68 0.57 
2000 141 7.40 1996 1383 3040.97 627.01 0.70 0.57 
2001 143 7.54 1430 2004 3408.02 733.89 0.71 0.57 
2002 149 6.62 1830 1948 3332.85 867.72 0.70 0.56 
2003 168 6.94 2238 2278 3322.73 710.83 0.71 0.58 
2004 190 6.68 2559 2473 3646.62 698.98 0.58 0.51 
2005 224 6.41 3044 3202 3948.55 612.13 0.56 0.48 
2006 274 5.89 3321 3305 3883.54 478.05 0.60 0.49 
2007 331 5.33 3434 4425 3706.23 367.49 0.64 0.50 
2008 363 5.00 3624 5306 2832.32 230.74 0.87 0.61 
2009 340 5.30 1582 2872 2213.60 148.18 1.76 0.97 
Notes: Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the period July 1998 through June 2009 for all stocks in Canada. For each year, we report the 
number of I/B/E/S firms, mean analysts covered for each firm, the total number of upward and downward revisions since the last monthly 




Table 2 Descriptive statistics 




Size (C$mils) Book-to-market Number of Analysts Percentiles 
Portfolio Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 25 50 75 
P1 (Strong downward) 3827 25352 3921.15 738.01 0.78 0.57 7.62 7.0 4.0 7.0 11.0 
P2 2495 2945 1880.77 211.66 0.78 0.56 4.29 3.0 2.0 3.0 6.0 





Table 3 Monthly stock returns for all sample periods 
 Characteristic based benchmark portfolio method 
Monthly return (Holding period) 
Portfolio 1 3 6  9 12 
P1 -0.0041*** -0.0018 0.0031*** 0.0020*** 0.0017*** 
(Strong downward) (-2.63) (-0.51) (3.34) (2.89) (2.82) 
P2 0.0047*** 0.0079*** 0.0076*** 0.0046*** 0.0032*** 
 (3.27) (6.33) (8.72) (6.55) (5.43) 
P3 0.0135*** 0.0133*** 0.0101*** 0.0092*** 0.0082*** 
(Strong upward) (9.14) (11.04) (11.45) (12.55) (13.49) 
P3 – P1 0.0176*** 0.0151*** 0.0069*** 0.0072*** 0.0065*** 
 (8.12) (7.11) (5.31) (6.98) (7.71) 
Notes: Table 3 reports the characteristic based benchmark-adjusted monthly portfolio returns for the period July 1998 through June 2009 for 
all stocks in Canada. We estimate the regression to find the characteristic based benchmark-adjusted monthly returns for a portfolio. The 
forecast revision is defined as the difference between the number of upward and downward revisions by equity analysts since the last monthly 
production. Each month we sort stocks into three forecast revisions portfolios based on analyst forecast revisions, REV in month t, which 
stocks in portfolio P3 (P1) are those contain higher (lower) net upward (downward) revisions. The portfolio is equally weighted at the 
formation month and held for 1, 3, 6, 9, 12 months. We skip one-month between formation and holding period to mitigate the market-




Table 4 Monthly stock returns for sub-periods 
 
Characteristic based benchmark portfolio method 




















0.0078** -0.0014 -0.0281*** -0.0092* -0.0267*** 
(2.38) (-1.09) (-6.36) (-1.78) (-7.77) 
P2 
0.0062** 0.0094*** -0.0070* 0.0032 -0.0164*** 
(2.25) (6.16) (-1.71) (1.05) (-4.61) 
P3 0.0235*** 0.0126*** -0.0082 -0.0109** -0.0208*** 
(Strong upward) (7.71) (10.12) (-1.63) (-2.46) (-6.05) 
P3 – P1 0.0156*** 0.0140*** 0.0198***   
 (3.51) (6.12) (2.88)   
Notes: Table 4 reports the characteristic based benchmark-adjusted monthly portfolio returns for the period July 1998 through June 2009 for 
all stocks in Canada. The forecast revision is defined as the difference between the number of upward and downward revisions by equity 
analysts since the last monthly production. Each month we sort stocks into three forecast revisions portfolios based on analyst forecast 
revisions, REV in month t, which stocks in portfolio P3 (P1) are those contain higher (lower) net upward (downward) revisions. The Policy is 
National Policy 51-201 (the “Policy”) which the Canadian Securities Administrators (the “CSA”) have adopted on 2002 to address concerns 
about the practice of selective disclosure. The crisis refers to the financial crisis of 2008. The portfolios are equally weighted at formation and 
held for 1 month. We skip one-month between formation and holding period to mitigate the market-microstructure effects. t-statistics are 




Table 5 Effect of Policy 51-201 Disclosure Standard and 2008 Financial Crisis on Forecast Revision 
and Post-revision Drift 
Dependent Variable: 
 1-month return 
(1) (2) (3) 
REV 
0.0015*** 0.0014*** 0.0011*** 
(4.31) (3.94) (3.30) 
ME 
0.0011 0.0093 0.0026 
(1.42) (1.23) (0.34) 
BM 
0.0110*** 0.0108** 0.0123*** 
(5.47) (5.36) (6.14) 
RAC 
-0.0015 -0.0076 -0.0072 
(-0.58) (-0.29) (-0.27) 
DISP 
-0.0014 -0.0032 -0.0013 
(0.05) (-0.11) (-0.05) 
MOMENTUM 
0.0014* 0.0015** 0.0011* 
(2.26) (2.49) (1.77) 
Policy 
 -0.0394*  
 (-1.78)  
REV*Policy 
 0.0033  
 (0.54)  
CRISIS 
  -0.0267*** 
  (-5.75) 
REV*CRISIS 
  0.0032* 
  (1.79) 
INTERCEPT 
-0.0021 0.0024 0.0131 
(-0.24) (0.25) (1.49) 
Number of Observations 20354 20354 20354 
R-squared 0.1528 0.1628 0.2120 
Notes: This table reports results from month-by-month Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regression of 
monthly abnormal returns on consensus recommendation revisions (Column 1), and interacted with 
Regulation FD (Column 2) and interacted with 2008 financial crisis (Column 3). REV is the forecast 
revision and is the difference between the number of upward revisions and the number of downward 
revisions by analysts since the last monthly report; ME is the log of the market value of the equity at 
time t-1; BM is the book-to-market ratios at time t-1; RAC is residual analyst cover measured by the 
residual from the regression of log (1+number of analysts) on log (firm size) at time t. DISP is the 
standard deviation of analysts' current-fiscal-year annual earnings per share forecasts scaled by the 
absolute value of the mean earnings forecast at time t. MOMENTUM is measured as the difference 
between the equally-weighted average return of firms with the higher 30 percent of 11-month returns 
lagged by 1 month and the average return of firms with the lower 30 percentage, CRISIS is a dummy 
variable that takes a value of 1 during the sub-prime crisis period (year 2008), and 0 otherwise. 
POLICY is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the analyst forecast revision is made after 2002 when 
National Policy 51-201 became effective and equal to 0 if made before 2002. REV *POLICY is the 
interaction term of REV and POLICY. REV *CRISIS is the interaction term of REV and CRISIS. 
The time-series average coefficients and Newey-West adjusted t-statistics (in parentheses) are 
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Table 6 Effect of Policy 51-201 Disclosure Standard and 2008 Financial Crisis on Forecast Revision and Post-revision Drift 




Negative Revision Count Positive Revision Count 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
REV 
-0.0092 -0.0011 -0.0011 0.0019** 0.0024** 0.0019** 
(-1.28) (-1.53) (-1.66) (2.48) (2.38) (2.53) 
ME 
0.0079 0.0039 -0.0021 -0.0011 -0.0017 -0.0016 
(0.72) (0.34) (-0.19) (-1.13) (-1.53) (-1.52) 
BM 
0.087*** 0.0079*** 0.0118*** 0.0171*** 0.0166*** 0.0176*** 
(2.10) (1.89) (2.83) (2.79) (2.72) (2.78) 
RAC 
-0.0082* -0.0076* -0.0055 -0.0099** - 0.0101** -0.0083** 
(-1.81) (-1.64) (-1.28) (-2.39) (-2.30) (-2.07) 
DISP 
-0.0047 -0.0049* -0.0057* -0.0058 -0.0046 0.0013 
(-1.57) (-1.64) (-1.85) (-1.07) (-0.84) (0.22) 
MOMENTUM 
0.0019 0.0019 0.0051 0.0023*** 0.0023*** 0.0016*** 
(1.36) (1.38) (0.89) (2.97) (2.85) (2.66) 
Policy 
 -0.0027   -0.0693*  
 (-0.62)   (-1.78)  
REV*Policy 
 0.0122   0.0069  
 (0.73)   (0.34)  
CRISIS 
  0.0120   -0.0137** 
  (0.21)   (-1.97) 
REV*CRISIS 
  0.0074   -0.0037 
  (0.75)   (-1.34) 
INTERCEPT 
-0.0138 -0.0065 -0.0085 0.0022 0.0108 0.0101 
(-0.77) (-0.34) (-0.36) (0.15) (0.67) (0.68) 
Number of  
Observations 
7077 7077 7077 5686 5686 5686 
R-squared 0.2747 0.2862 0.3639 0.2788 0.3005 0.3779 
Notes: This table reports results from month-by-month Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regression of monthly abnormal 
returns on consensus recommendation revisions, Column 1 to 3 is for negative revision count, Column 4 to 6 is for positive 
revision count group, and interacted with Policy (Column 2 and 5) and interacted with 2008 financial crisis (Column 3 and 
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6). REV is the forecast revision count and is the difference between the number of upward revisions and the number of 
downward revisions by analysts since the last monthly report; ME is the log of the market value of the equity at time t-1; 
BM is the book-to-market ratios at time t-1; RAC is residual analyst cover measured by the residual from the regression of 
log (1+number of analysts) on log (firm size) at time t. DISP is the standard deviation of analysts' current-fiscal-year annual 
earnings per share forecasts scaled by the absolute value of the mean earnings forecast at time t. MOMENTUM is measured 
as the difference between the equally-weighted average return of firms with the higher 30 percent of 11-month returns 
lagged by 1 month and the average return of firms with the lower 30 percentage, CRISIS is a dummy variable that takes a 
value of 1 during the sub-prime crisis period (year 2008), and 0 otherwise. POLICY is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the 
analyst forecast revision is made after 2002 when National Policy 51-201 became effective and equal to 0 if made before 
2002. REV *POLICY is the interaction term of REV and POLICY. REV *CRISIS is the interaction term of REV and 
CRISIS. The time-series average coefficients and Newey-West adjusted t-statistics (in parentheses) are presented. The 
symbols, *, **, and ***, indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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